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Abstract. We explore the training of generative adversarial networks with dif-
ferential privacy to anonymize image data sets. On MNIST, we numerically
measure the privacy-utility trade-off using parameters from -δ differential pri-
vacy and the inception score. Our experiments uncover a saturated training
regime where an increasing privacy budget adds little to the quality of gen-
erated images. We also explain analytically why differentially private Adam
optimization is independent of the gradient clipping parameter. Furthermore,
we highlight common errors in previous works on differentially private deep
learning, which we uncovered in recent literature. Throughout treatment of the
subject, we hope to prevent erroneous estimates of anonymity in the future.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy is the de-facto standard for anonymized release of statistical
measurements (Dwork et al., 2014). The method information-theoretically lim-
its how much of any individual example in a data set is leaked into the released
statistics. Risks of privacy infringement remain therefore bounded independent
of the infringement method. This independence is key as increasingly power-
ful expert systems are trained on cross-referenced statistics, which may lead to
accidental, inconceivably intricate, and hard-to-detect infringements. In this
work, we explore a method able to anonymize not only derived statistical mea-
surements, but the underlying raw data set with the same differential-privacy
guarantees. We follow others in training generative adversarial neural networks
(GANs) with differential privacy.
Abadi et al. (2016) proposed a method of training neural networks with
differential privacy in their seminal paper. The authors proposed to make the
gradient computations of stochastic gradient descent (SGD) a randomized mech-
anism by clipping the L-2 norm of parameter gradients in each example, and
by adding random Gaussian noise to the gradients. Using the same method,
we show that it is possible to train generative adversarial networks (GANs) on
high-dimensional images (for an overview see Gui et al. (2020)). Their generator
networks can then be used to synthesize image data that are of high utility for
further processing, but have guaranteed privacy for the original data source.
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Privacy-preserving training of GANs with DP-SGD has been attempted
recently. Beaulieu-Jones et al. (2017) trained a generator for labeled blood-
pressure trajectories to synthesize anonymous samples from the SPRINT trial
using the AC-GAN approach. Zhang et al. (2018) devised the Wasserstein
GAN with gradient penalty to train a generator for MNIST and CIFAR10. To
improve training with privacy, they grouped parameters according to their gra-
dients and adjusted the clipping boundary for each group. Xie et al. (2018) use
the original Wasserstein GAN procedure wherein the critic’s (discriminator’s)
parameters are clipped. This in turn ensures that gradients are bounded, thus
fulfilling the criteria to compute privacy bounds from the noise variance added
to the gradients.
In the remaining, we discuss the prior works cited above and point out
some important fallacies. We then present or own analysis of differentially
private synthetic data generated from the MNIST data set. We discuss how DP
parameters affect the quality of generated images, which we measure using the
inception score.
2 Methods
2.1 Differentially private stochastic gradient descent
A randomized mechanism h : D → R satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy if the
following inequality holds for any adjacent pair of data sets d, d′ ∈ D and S ⊂ R:
P [h(d) ∈ S] ≤ eP [h(d′) ∈ S] + δ . (1)
The Gaussian randomized mechanism adds to an n-dimensional mechanism f
random Gaussian noise with variance C2σ2, wherein C is the L-2 sensitivity
of the mechanism across neighboring data sets, and σ is the noise multiplier.
Drawing vector-valued independent Gaussian variates ξ ∼ N (0, C2σ2In×n), the
mechanism is defined as
h(x) = f(x) + ξ . (2)
In the training of neural networks with stochastic gradient descent, the mech-
anism f is the computation of parameter gradient update g, i.e. the mean over
parameter gradients gj from samples j across a mini-batch B:
g =
1
|B|
∑
j∈B
gj (3)
Only one gradient gk differs in Eq. (3) between adjacent data sets. Let us
suppose we can limit the L-2 norm of individual gradients to C. Then g has an
L-2 sensitivity of C/B across adjacent data sets.
Based upon this theory, Abadi et al. (2016) has formulated differentially
private SGD, which we reproduce in Algo. (1). Note, that the gradient’s L-2
norm of each example is clipped individually (line 5), and that independent
and vector-valued Gaussian variates ξ are added (line 6). One may replace the
simple descent step (line 7) with any higher order, or moment based algorithm
of gradient descent such as RMSprop or Adam, for example (Kingma and Ba,
2015, Tieleman et al., 2012).
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Algorithm 1: Differentially private SGD (Abadi et al., 2016)
Input: Examples {x1, ..., xn}, neural-network parameters θ, loss function
L(θ, xi), learning rate η, noise scale σ, gradient norm bound C,
random noise ξ ∼ N (0, σ2C2I)
Output: Differentially private parameters θ
1 for t < T do
2 Sample a random minibatch B
3 for xi ∈ B do
4 Compute gi ← ∇θtL(θt, xi)
5 gi ← gi/max(1, ||gi||2/C)
6 g ← 1|B| (ξ +
∑
i gi)
7 θ ← θ − ηtg
2.2 Differentially private generative adversarial training
Zhang et al. (2018) observed that, when training a generative adversarial net-
work for data release, the Gaussian mechanism can be confined either to the
generator or to the critic. They argue that applying the Gaussian mechanism
only to the critic permits batch-right normalization techniques to be used in the
generator. In Algo. (2), we reproduce their differentially private Wasserstein
GAN with gradient penalty. Note the similarity between lines 9 and 10 in the
critic step, and lines 5 and 6 in Algo. (1). These lines are responsible for im-
plementing the Gaussian randomized mechanism. Also, note that the generator
training step does neither involve gradient clipping nor random perturbations.
It does also not depend on the data set as long as the schedule updating the
learning rate ηt is differentially private. This includes early stopping.
2.3 Quantifying the loss of privacy
Differentially private training of neural nets was formulated using the Gaussian
mechanism, but its application is only useful if we are able to estimate tight
upper bounds for the privacy lost. This loss is quantified by the parameters 
and δ from Eq. (1). Such an upper bound was derived by Mironov (2017) and
Mironov et al. (2019), in which they use the theory of Re´nyi differential privacy
(RDP). Their analysis is technically complicated, and we will only sketch its
elements here.
Re´nyi differential privacy (RDP) is formulated in terms of the Re´nyi diver-
gence of two probability distributions p and q:
Dα(p || q) = 1
α− 1 log〈
(
p(x)
q(x)
)α
〉x∼q (4)
A mechanism h : D → R fulfills (α, ′)-RDP if, for all neighboring data sets
d, d′ ∈ D and S ⊂ R, h obeys the inequality:
Dα [P (h(d) ∈ S) || P (h(d′) ∈ S)] ≤ ′ (5)
Mironov (2017) also linked the two definitions of differential privacy (1) and (5):
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Algorithm 2: Differentially private WGAN-DP (Zhang et al., 2018)
Input: Examples {x1, ..., xn}, neural-network parameters θ and w,
learning rate η, noise scale σ, gradient norm bound C, random
noise ξ ∼ N(0, σ2C2I)
Output: Differentially private parameters θ
1 for t < T do
2 for s = 1, . . . , ncritic do
/* differentially private critic step */
3 Sample a random minibatch B
4 for xi ∈ B do
5 Sample z from P (z), and ρ ∈ [0, 1]
6 y ← ρxi + (1− ρ)G(z)
7 Li ← D(G(z))−D(xi) + λ (||∇xD|y||2 − 1)2
8 gi ← ∇wLi
9 gi ← gi/max(1, ||gi||2/C)
10 g ← 1|B| (ξ +
∑
i gi)
11 w ← w − ηtg
/* non-private generator step */
12 Sample |B| instances of zi from P (z)
13 gt ← 1|B|
∑|B|
i=1∇θD(G(zi))
14 θ ← θ − ηtgt
Each mechanism satisfying (α, ′)-RDP also satisfies (, δ)-DP with
 = ′(α)− log δ
α− 1 . (6)
One is free to choose δ. Then, one typically chooses the α that minimizes .
Mironov et al. (2019) give the details on how to compute ′(α) for one step
of the sampled Gaussian randomized mechanism, stochastic gradient descent.
Across multiple steps, the epsilons add linearly. Adding the values for ′ of each
optimization step, we compute the privacy budget in terms of α and ′ and
convert it to δ and  using Eq. (6). In sum, this gives us an upper bound for
(, δ)-DP for our GAN training, that limits the privacy leaked from the data set
into the generator.
2.4 MNIST data set
The MNIST dataset contains 70,000 labeled images of digits. We used the 60,000
examples of its training data set to train GANs. To optimize the classifier for
the computation of inception scores, we also used the 10,000 examples in the
test set as a validation set.
2.5 Measuring the quality of generated images
To assess the quality of generated images, we adopt the inception score (IS):
A classifier K with classes k generates a probability distribution P (k|x) when
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applied to examples x of a data set X. The conditional probability is related to
the marginal P (k) = 〈P (k|x)〉x∼X using the Kullback-Leibler divergence:
KL(P || Q) = 〈logP − logQ〉x∼X (7)
The inception score s(X) is defined as the exponential of the mean Kullback-
Leibler divergence:
s(X) = exp
[
M∑
k=1
KL(P (k|x) || P (k))/M
]
(8)
Note that the IS framework requires a classifier of high quality. The score
takes values between 1 and the number of classes M . It has been argued that
the IS correlates well with subjective image quality because of a subjective bias
towards class-distinguishing image features (Salimans et al., 2016).
2.6 Architecture of the generative adversarial network
We train Wasserstein generative adversarial networks using gradient penalty
with Adam optimization. The critic (discriminator) consists of three stridden
convolutional layers with leaky ReLU activation functions of negative slope 0.2.
The first layer has a number of filters, the capacity, with a kernel size of 5. The
number of filters doubles with each convolutional layer. The generator starts
with a 128-dimensional Gaussian latent space that is processed by three convo-
lutions that transpose the structure of the critic. Padding is chosen to match
the 28-by-28 pixel images of MNIST. The network is trained in batches using
Adam with β1 = 0.9 and β2 = 0.5 (default values in PyTorch and Tensorflow).
3 Results
3.1 Review of prior work
Differentially private stochastic gradient descent has been previously used to
train generative adversarial networks (Beaulieu-Jones et al., 2017, Xie et al.,
2018, Zhang et al., 2018). Beaulieu-Jones et al. (2017) use the original GAN
algorithm with a binary classification in the classifier. They clip the gradients
after averaging, but not the parameters (W-GAN step). In Methods, they write:
... we limit the maximum distance of any of these [optimization]
steps and then add a small amount of random noise.
As we outlined in Sec. 2.1, limiting each step, i.e. clipping the average gradient,
is not sufficient to grant differential privacy to each example. Each contribution
to the gradient needs to be clipped individually. At the time of writing, this error
also conforms with their published code (github.com/greenelab/SPRINT gan).
Results presented by Beaulieu-Jones et al. (2017) may still be correct because
the authors use a batch size of one throughout the paper.
In the public code repository implementing the experiments reported by
Zhang et al. (2018), we have encountered a stray factor 1/
√|B| in the com-
putation of the noise. At a batch-size of 64, the noise is, therefore, a factor
eight too small to grant the differential privacy constraints computed from the
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reported clipping and noise multiplier. Furthermore, the clipping is performed
in a non-standard way: the authors group sets of parameters – e.g. all biases
– and clip their gradients’ L-2 norm separately. The difference to regular clip-
ping is probably proportional to the number of groups. The clipped gradients
are, therefore, about a factor of about 10 larger than when clipped in the stan-
dard way. These programming and conceptual errors leave the applied privacy
analysis inapplicable.
Xie et al. (2018) use the original W-GAN algorithm in which parameters
are clipped. They go on to show that bounded network parameters, images,
and classifications result in bounded parameter gradients thus fulfilling the DP
conditions. They compute the bound cg, and use it for their DP algorithm. Un-
fortunately, the authors neither write how they scale noise with cg, nor do they
publish their algorithm in the public repository (github.com/illidanlab/dpgan).
3.2 Empirical exploration of differentially private synthetic
data generated from MNIST
To evaluate the inception score, we trained a classifier on the ten classes of the
MNIST training data set. On the test set, our trained classifier achieved an
accuracy of 99.6%, which is comparable to the state of the art for an individual
neural-network classifier. We also computed the inception score of the original
data sets and achieved s = 9.73± 0.05 (train set), and 9.61± 0.04 (test set).
We used this classifier to compute the inception scores reported in the fol-
lowing sections. Specifically, we describe our findings of how the gradient clip-
ping, the noise multiplier, and the network capacity affected the privacy-utility
relationship between privacy parameter , and inception score IS. In the com-
putation of , we set δ = 10−5 to align our results with other publications that
use the same value. Note that there is still no consensus how to choose δ, opti-
mally. In all figures, we counterposed the results with a non-anonymous GAN
training. We mark its maximum inception score, i.e. ISmax = 8.51, by a hori-
zontal dashed line. All experiments were done with the public code repository
at ”github.com/jusjusjus/noise-in-dpsgd-2020/tree/v1.0.0”.
3.2.1 Adam is almost independent of gradient clipping
For Adam optimization, ”[...] the magnitudes of parameter updates are invariant
to rescaling of the gradient” (Kingma and Ba, 2015). Specifically, Adam tracks
running means of the value mt and square vt of incoming averaged gradients
gt at time step t. The parameter update ∆pt is normalized by these running
means (some details omitted for clarity):
mt = β1mt−1 + (1− β1)gt
vt = β2vt−1 + (1− β2)g2t (9)
∆pt = η
mt√
vt
Let us choose C smaller than all individual gradient L-2 norms throughout the
whole training process. This is possible if we assume that the gradients are non-
zero. Then we can rewrite gt = C(ξˆ+gt/||g2t ||), wherein ξˆ = ξ/C is independent
of C. After entering the expression for gt in Eqns. (9), C cancels if we replace
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m0 → Cm0 and v0 → C2v0. For such small values of C, the training becomes
C-independent due to the normalization property of Adam optimization.
Figure 1: Privacy-utility plot for different gradient L2-norm clips C. For C = 0.1
and C = 1 we observed comparable IS, whereas for C = 100, IS as a function
of  was systematically reduced.
Adam’s rescaling property, thus, divides L-2 clipping constant C into two
regimes set by the smallest gradient norm in the data set. (i) For smaller values
of C, all gradients are clipped equally. (ii) For larger values, the individual
gradient norm weights the gradient sum over the mini-batch.
Empirically we found that regime (i), in which C is chosen arbitrarily small,
showed the largest inception score. Larger values of C led to smaller values of
the inception score. We choose C = 1 in the following, which was below the
per-example gradient norm in our experiments.
3.2.2 Critically large noise multipliers
The noise multiplier σ is inversely related to the signal-to-noise ratio in the
gradients. One may, therefore, expect that large σ are detrimental to learning
as optimal parameter values are escaped by random perturbations.
We trained generators with DP-Adam at C = 1, for a variety of values of σ
while monitoring their inception score and  (Eq. (1)). Throughout training, the
score increased initially then to approach a maximal level. We found that the
maximal inception score showed little dependence on values of σ < 0.9 reaching
about s = 7.2. For σ > 0.9, the score showed a steep break-off only reaching
about s = 3 at optimal levels of the privacy budget (cf. Fig. 2).
Herein we observe the existence of a critical noise multiplier beyond which a
privacy-utility trade-off will likely be sub-optimal, as we discuss further below.
3.2.3 Optimal network capacity
We trained generators with DP-SGD at a variety of network capacities while
monitoring their inception score and privacy loss  (Eq. (1)). The score ap-
proached a capacity-dependent maximum with increasing steps. We found that
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Figure 2: Privacy-utility plot for different noise multipliers σ. At σ < 0.9, we
observed a plateau of IS that was mostly shifted to larger  for smaller σ. At
σ = 1.0, we observed another regimen in which training led to much lower values
of IS with shallow gains during continued training.
the maximal inception score was biggest for an intermediate network capacity
of 32, while larger and small capacities reached lower levels.
4 Discussion
Generative anonymization of data through differential privacy promises a quan-
tifiable trade-off between the protection of individual privacy and the ability to
use raw data sets for machine learning. In this article, we explore the training
of generative adversarial networks for image data under differential privacy con-
straints. We found that some of the previous articles that explored this option
showed technical and conceptual flaws (Beaulieu-Jones et al., 2017, Zhang et al.,
2018). In our introduction we provided a detailed workup of differential privacy
in deep learning, which we hope will further clarify this intricate mathematical
theory for future researchers.
It is in the interest of a practitioner to maximize the utility of the generator
while staying within a specific privacy budget. We explored this privacy-utility
trade-off in the MNIST data set1. We uncovered two modes of DP-GAN train-
ing showing distinct characteristic dependencies between privacy loss and image
utility; an optimal one in which the utility steeply increased with spent privacy
eventually reaching a plateau, and a sub-optimal one, wherein the slope was
shallow (cf. Fig. 1 at C = 100 and Fig. 2 at σ = 1). Sub-optimal privacy-utility
characteristics crossed through optimal ones at low levels of the utility. On the
other hand, the plateau in optimal characteristics did not seem to dependent
on the hyperparameters. In Fig. 2, for example, we observed a stable plateau
over an order of magnitude in , and for different values of the noise multiplier.
1Our work reproduces experiments initially published by Zhang et al. (2018). We do not
compare these results to ours because of the aforementioned errors.
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Figure 3: Privacy-utility plot for different network capacities. We observed
a consistent maximum for a network capacity of 32 compared with the other
tested capacities.
We also found that the break-off between optimal and sub-optimal character-
istics was abrupt, wherein increases in σ or C let to a sudden change in the
observed characteristics. We hypothesize that too small signal-to-noise ratios
in anonymous gradient updates make the stochastic optimization process un-
able to uncover minima in the parameter space. The hypothesis is consistent
with break-offs upon increases in σ and C. It is also consistent with the large
fluctuations in utility present in sub-optimal characteristics.
We also explained analytically why DP-GAN training with Adam becomes
gradient-clipping independent for small values of the clipping constant. This
result generalizes to other methods of gradient descent with normalization. Fur-
thermore, we found a weak dependence of the utility plateau on the network
capacity. In the non-DP case, small capacities show reduced expressivity in the
generator thus degrading the utility. A reduction was not visible, however, at
increased capacities (computations not shown). When training with differential
privacy, we found that increased capacity led to a systematic decrease in util-
ity. In these high-capacity networks, more terms enter the gradient L-2 norm
thus enhancing the effect of the clipping. We hypothesize that this is the main
mechanism leading to a degraded utility in larger networks.
Our simple explorations are limited by the approximations with which we
explore the privacy-utility relationship. Privacy was indirectly measured as an
upper privacy bound, and utility was indirectly measured with the inception
score. In future works, one should complement these metrics with direct mea-
sures of privacy through membership-inference attacks and classification scores
on generated images, for example.
In applications, privacy-utility plots could be a useful tool to tune param-
eters in a data anonymization workflow. The method needs to be carefully
adopted, however, because additional privacy loss incurs during hyperparam-
eter optimization (Abadi et al., 2016), and the auxiliary classifier network we
used needs to be trained with differential privacy as well.
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In sum, we found that it is indeed possible to generate differentially private
synthetic data set within a moderate privacy budget of  ≤ 10. However, we
presume that the reduced utility for parameter-rich networks will be a major
hurdle when training DP-GANs for larger, more nuanced image data sets than
MNIST. This could become a problem in particular, when close to a sub-optimal
training regime in the signal-to-noise ratio of parameter gradients.
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